Economic Sanctions, Morality and Escalation of Demands on Yugoslavia

Economic sanctions are envisaged as a sort of punishment, based on what should be an institutional decision not unlike a court ruling. Hence, the conditions for their lifting should be clearly stated and once those are met sanctions should be lifted. But this is generally not what happens, and perhaps is precluded by the very nature of international sanctioning. Sanctions clearly have political, economic, military and strategic consequences, but the question raised here is whether sanctions can also have moral justification. Illustrated by the example of international sanctions against Yugoslavia, the authors show how the process of escalating demands on a target country, inherent to the very process of sanctioning, can lead ultimately even to overt aggression. As a result of this logic of escalation, economic sanctions cannot be articulated properly in any law-like system. Economic sanctions have much more in common with war than legal punishment, and in fact represent a form of siege. As such, they cannot be ended simply on the basis of their initial rationale, for the very process of sanctions implementation opens up possibilities for setting new goals and a continuous redefinition of the goal that sanctions are seen to have

The Ethics of International Sanctions: The Case of Yugoslavia

Sanctions such as those applied by the United Nations against Yugoslavia, or rather the actions of implementing and maintaining them, at the very least implicitly purport to have moral justification. While the rhetoric used to justify sanctions is clearly moralistic, even sanctions themselves, as worded, often include phrases indicating moral implication. On May 30, 1992, United Nation Security Council Resolution 757 imposed a universal, binding blockage on all trade and all scientific, cultural and sports exchanges with Serbia and Montenegro. In addition to expressing the usual "concern' and "dismay" regarding various events, the language of this Resolution also includes, on three occasions, unmistakably moral language "deploring" failures in meeting the demands of earlier resolutions.' There is no question that sanctions have political, economic, military and trategic consequences for the sanctioned state, perhaps exactly as desired by the sanctioning party. However, the question raised in this essay is whether in addition to these consequences, sanctions also produce morally reprehensible consequences that undermine their often-cited moral justification. If so, international economic sanctions are an immoral means of achieving primarily political goals. Six morally significant consequences are: 1) The unethical, elevated susceptibility of the sanctioned to olitical (and other forms of) manipulation, 2) the inherent and unjust paternalism in the process of sanctioning, 3) the abandonment of strict moral criteria on virtually all levels of evaluation, primarily inside the sanctioned country, but also in sanctioning states best exhibited in the attitudes toward the sanctioned, 4) the general decline in moral consciousness, 5) the subsequent rise of many forms of violence within the sanctioned state in connection with the increase in lawlessness, and a general decline of expectations in all areas of life, and 6) the continual, arbitrary redefining of conditions for a final lifting of sanctions. In light of this moral phenomenology we shall argue that sanctions, lacking in moral justification, are simply a means for achieving the mentioned immoral goals. Furthermore, the argument will be that sanctions are a form of siege and, as such, an act of war, requiring the sort of justification that would be needed to justify a war

Jedan svet, i mi u njemu

Aspiracija za jedinstvenim upravljanjem svetom je stara koliko i sam svet. Ona u suštini proizlazi iz naše percepcije sveta kao jednog, bez obzira na sve razlike koje se u njemu takođe vide. U naše vreme ova percepcija je pojačana utiskom o sve većoj međuzavisnosti delova sveta, kao i osećajem da su razlike, ma koliko bile velike, sve manje važne u odnosu na ono što je isto ili bar slično u različitim delovima sveta. Ovaj osećaj jedinstva je još više pojačan percepcijom potrebe, ili nužde, da se o važnim stvarima u svetu odlučuje i upravlja na jedinstven način, bez kolizija koje bi proces odlučivanja učinile neefikasnim ili nemogućim. Ali jedinstvo sveta bi trebalo da u sebi sadrži ideju ravnopravnosti, i neke načelne jednakosti. Međutim, uvidom u način na koji se ovaj proces unifikacije sveta stvarno odvija vidimo mnoge probleme. Neki od njih su za očekivati – problemi reprezentacije i pristanka na svetsku vlast koja bi bila odraz jedinstvene zakonodavne volje čovečanstva. Takva volja možda uopšte ne može da se konstituiše. Umesto nje imamo volju za hegemonijom koju prati ideja nejednakosti i manihejske podele sveta na naš i tuđi deo, kao i razne vrste pokušaja ukidanja onog uslova koji svakom zakonodavstvu daje njegov legitimet – a to je sloboda. Suočavamo se sa idejom da je, kao uslov mira i demokratije (šta god da to znači, ili što će značiti u bližoj i daljoj budućnosti) potrebno uspostaviti krutu nejednakost i rigidnu kontrolu svih različitosti u jednom zamrznutom stanju podele na povlašćene i obezvlašćene, na „dobre“ i „loše“ momke, kao da se svet sastoji od „momaka“. Ključni deo ove sheme je pretpostavka o univerzalnoj samerljivosti svega što život čini vrednim. Ta pretpostavka uniformiše i simplifikuje, smanjuje, svet, negirajući relevanciju i stvarnost razlikama koji sada predstavljaju stvarnost sveta. Zakoni više ne pretpostavljaju postojanje zakonodavne volje. U toj situaciji proizvodnja ogromne količine iluzorne sreće više liči na podmićivanje svetskog lumpenproletarijata, sa rizikom da celokupno čovečanstvo postane totalno ravnodušno prema svakoj posebnosti i svakoj vrlini, sasvim primereno svojoj novoj lumpenproleterskoj prirodi

JEDAN SVET, I MI U NJEMU - PRILOG KRITICI GLOBALIZACIJE

The aspiration for the unified world governance is old as the world itself. As a matter of fact, it comes from our perception of the world as one, regardless of all the differences that could also be seen within. Somehow, it seems that the world, despite all differences that exist, is still only one, or at least that it is one same context in which all the differences which are in the world are placed. In our time, this perception is reinforced by the impression of the increasing interdependence of the world, as well as a sense that the differences, became less important compared to what is the same or at least the similar in the different parts of the world, no matter how large the differences are. This sense of unity is further enhanced by the perception of need or necessity, to decide and manage the important things in the world in a unified manner, without collisions that could make the decision making process ineffective or even impossible.Aspiracija za jedinstvenim upravljanjem svetom je stara koliko i svet. Ona proizlazi iz naše percepcije sveta kao jednog, bez obzira na sve razlike koje se u njemu takođe vide. Nekako izgleda da je svet, uprkos svim razlikama, ipak jedan, ili bar da je to jedan i isti kontekst u kome su smeštene sve one razlike koje se nalaze u svetu. U naše vreme ova percepcija je pojačana utiskom o sve većoj međuzavisnosti delova sveta, kao i osećajem da su razlike, ma koliko bile velike, sve manje važne u odnosu na ono što je isto ili bar slično u različitim delovima sveta. Ovaj osećaj jedinstva je još više pojačan percepcijom potrebe, ili nužde, da se o važnim stvarima u svetu odlučuje i upravlja na jedinstven način, bez kolizija koje bi proces odlučivanja učinile neefkasnim ili nemogućim

Etika rata i „teorija pravednog rata“

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness (“justice”) are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution (through adequate definitions), the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war theory.” However, “just war theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare (reducing it to an incomprehensible individual level, as if a group of people entered a battle in hopes of finding another group of people willing to respond). Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability (obtained through laws), is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability (which could simply be incompetence, or because peace, as a specific articulation of distribution of social power, is not tenable anymore) forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time (and expressed in customary and legal rules of warfare), with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive